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We analyse  the drivers  of  two  successive  leadership  changes  in  the  regional,  or mid-sized  jet market,
a  particularly  dynamic  segment  of  the  commercial  aircraft  industry.  In  the  ﬁrst  instance,  Bombardier,  a
Canadian  newcomer,  assumed  leadership  over  the  incumbents,  BAe  and  Fokker,  in 1995.  In  2005,  the
Brazilian  ﬁrm,  Embraer,  became  the  market  leader  in  terms  of number  of  regional  jet deliveries.  Our
theoretical  framework  considers  discontinuities  in the  building  blocks  of  sectoral  innovation  systems
as  windows  of  opportunity  for which  challenger  ﬁrms  can  devise  strategic  responses  allowing  them  to
assume  market  leadership.  It  also  considers  preconditions  as necessary  capabilities  limiting  the  number
of potential  challenger  companies.  The  analysis  of leadership  change  shows  that  more  efﬁcient  engines
and  technological  improvements  in subsystems,  changing  oil  prices,  business  cycles,  liberalization  of
air  transport  services,  scope  clauses  and  government  interventions  provided  technological,  demand  and
regulatory  windows  of opportunity.  Launching  new  aircraft  families  (an architectural  innovation),  target-
ing the 50- and  the  100–120-seat  niche  markets  gave  ﬁrst  Bombardier’s  CRJ  family  and  later  Embraer’s
E-Jet  family  the leadership.  The  fate  of  failed  challengers  and  incumbents  point  to  the  importance  of
incumbent  traps, technological  and  ﬁnancial  capabilities,  the  timing  of  windows  of opportunity,  speedy
strategic  response,  a proper  evaluation  of future  demand  and  sheer  luck,  as  long  lead  times  and  sunk
costs  entrap  incumbents  and  other inadequately  responding  companies.ectoral innovation systems
ircraft industry
egional jets
indows of opportunity
echnological capability accumulation
ncumbent trap
© 2016  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.ndicators
. Introduction
Schumpeterian dynamics constantly change companies’ market
hares. A handful of successful innovators may become industry
eaders, until new challengers arise to “dethrone” them (Mowery
nd Nelson, 1999; Schumpeter, 1934, 1942). Successive leader-
hip changes have characterized the regional jet (RJ) manufacturing
ndustry since its emergence. This highly turbulent segment of the
erospace industry has witnessed the entry of ﬁrms from advanced
nd emerging economies, and the exit of long-established produc-Please cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
rs (Steenhuis, 2015).
Studies on industrial dynamics in aircraft manufacturing have
rimarily focused on producers of large civil aircraft (LCA) (Frenken
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: daniel.vertesy@jrc.ec.europa.eu
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
048-7333/© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.and Leydesdorff, 2000; Golich, 1992; Moran and Mowery, 1991;
Pavcnik, 2002). The market for mid-sized jets, unlike the consoli-
dated LCA market, is in continuous turmoil. Some companies had
a long tradition in designing and producing aircraft (i.e., Fokker,
Canadair or British Aerospace (BAe) and its predecessors), others
were relative newcomers (i.e., the Brazilian Embraer or the Chinese
Comac). Companies’ motivations to gain technological competence
in RJs vary; some consider this market as a stepping-stone towards
the more challenging LCA market, others aim to maximize proﬁt
from RJs.
This paper explores the history of catch up and leadership
changes that took place in the global RJ industry from the late 1980s
to 2010, by studying the co-evolution of technology, the competi- of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
tive landscape, and the strategies of ﬁrms and governments. It aims
to explain what triggered periods of catch-up and instances of lead-
ership change, and why  incumbents lost their leading positions.
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Section 2 provides a background on the industry, its emergence
nd the account of two instances of leadership change. Section 3
resents the theoretical framework and key arguments to test in
ase studies. Sections 4 and 5 offer in-depth analyses of leadership
hange from the early leaders to Bombardier, and subsequently
rom Bombardier to Embraer, by discussing windows of opportu-
ity, strategic responses and the preconditions with respect to all
elevant companies. Finally, Section 6 synthesizes the conclusions.
. The regional jet industry and the record of leadership
hanges
.1. About the industry
We  deﬁne RJs as turbofan-engine-powered aircraft carrying typ-
cally 30 to 120 passengers at a range of up to 2000-2500 M.1
heir size, range and operational costs on shorter distances dis-
inguish RJs from LCA, while both share many technological and
perational commonalities. The upper boundary of the regional
egment is elusive as the smallest members of the Boeing 737 or
irbus 320 families show certain similarities to the largest Embraer
-Jets. Propulsion, rather than seating capacity, distinguishes RJs
rom turboprop-powered commuters. Turboprops may  be more
conomical to operate on short distances than RJs, but are noisier
nd offer limited cruising altitude, speed and range. Based on our
eﬁnition, many smaller jets of preceding decades would qualify
s RJs.2 However, those aircraft served different markets (con-
ecting main airports rather than extending service to regional
irports) and were not optimized for shorter routes, which were
ypically ﬂown by turboprop commuters. RJs show commonalities
ith larger business jets. They may  be identical from a technologi-
al perspective but serve different customers, so demand patterns
iffer. Nevertheless, the various similarities allow commercial air-
raft producers to enter the RJ market relatively easily (Steenhuis,
015).
RJ manufacturing does not differ from the structure of the
ature commercial aircraft manufacturing industry. By the 1990s,
his had transformed into a pyramid-shape hierarchy, with sys-
em assemblers on top, followed by primary structures and system
uppliers, and component producers on lower tiers. Aerospace
ompanies with multiple competencies can be competitors and
ollaborators at the same time (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). Com-
etitiveness in the global aircraft industry is affected by many
nterrelated factors, including access to capital and risk-sharing
artners, government support, design capabilities and production
apacity, internal organization of corporations and markets, and
he characteristics of aircraft programmes. These include price and
peration costs, which can beneﬁt from commonality with other
odels and maintenance arrangements (USITC, 1998). The com-
lexity of factors implies that leadership change is best analysed
rom a co-evolutionary perspective, considering technology, ﬁrms,
arkets and institutions (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2000; Frenken,
000).
.2. The take-off of regional jets and the early innovators
We  date the emergence of the RJ industry to the introductionPlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
f the BAe-146 family and the Fokker F-100 in the early 1980s. RJs
on the battle against turboprops due to a combination of factors.
apidly increasing oil prices in the 1970s triggered the develop-
1 Given the multitude of deﬁnitions, we apply a comprehensive one based on
teenhuis (2015), Wikipedia, Jane’s and various articles of Flight International, Avia-
ion Week & Space Technology and BAe, Bombardier and Embraer publications.
2 I.e. the SE-120 Caravelle, the BAC-111 or the DC-9-10.Fig. 1. Average annual crude oil prices in real terms (1970–2011).
Source: US Department of Transport
ment of new, fuel-efﬁcient aircraft (Fig. 1). The introduction of a
new generation of turbofan (jet) engines with a relatively higher
bypass ratio rendered RJs proﬁtable even on shorter routes. The
liberalization of US air transport services in 1978 opened new mar-
kets for smaller jets offering direct connections between regional
airports, and connecting regional airports with hubs. Congested
hubs discouraged slower and turbulence-sensitive turboprop com-
muters that carried fewer passengers but used similar or more
airspace compared to LCAs. A subsequent decline in kerosene prices
in the 1980s ensured that the newly introduced RJs gained market
share. Passengers preferred jets that offered a modern alternative to
replace aging turboprops (Ramsden, 1989b). In conjunction, these
developments radically changed the market. Airlines could now
select smaller jets as a strategic choice, rather than due to techno-
logical constraints.
RJs emerged in Europe, while the US was the overall leader in
aerospace. McDonnell Douglas (MDD) and Boeing chose to target
the apparently more lucrative LCA and abandoned the regional
market. The aircraft industry was rather advanced in the UK and in
the Netherlands, with companies beneﬁting from strong linkages
with governments. BAe and Fokker could exploit their experience
of producing and selling various types of aircraft, and their estab-
lished networks of suppliers3 (Broekel and Boschma, 2012; Cooke
and Ehret, 2009).
Many of BAe’s and Fokker’s strategic choices on design and
marketing were emulated by subsequent leaders. Both companies
recognized that cost-efﬁciency was crucial in the regional market,
which necessitated efﬁcient product design and large production
capacity. Both companies designed their aircraft in-house. The BAe-
146 109-seater jet was based on an earlier shelved project of a
predecessor company, but was  equipped with four modern engines
(Hewish, 1982). BAe intensiﬁed collaborations both in-house and
with external partners, including one sharing the risks of develop-
ment and production. Fokker’s F-100 twinjet was a fundamentally
upgraded derivative of its F-28 model.4 The F-100 was  produced in
partnership with British and US-based ﬁrms. The BAe-146 design
utilized the family concept to maximize commonalities and reduce
costs, and was offered in three sizes catering for individual airline
needs, covering seating capacities from 70 to 128. Fokker also aimed
to launch a family, but only managed to introduce a smaller deriva-
tive (the F-70), due to liquidity problems. Both aircraft differed
substantially from other available models. The BAe-146 family of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
ations. The F-100 offered relatively lower structure-weight per seat,
due to using composite materials for control surfaces and inte-
3 For a complete list of successful commercial aircraft programs and ﬁrms of
the  UK following World War  II, see “Post-war UK civil aircraft production” Flight
International, 19 Dec 2006. The Dutch commercial aircraft industry was virtually
monopolized by Fokker.
4 Experts debate whether the Fokker’s F-28 Fellowship was the ﬁrst RJ, 240 of
which were produced from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s.
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ource: www.airlinerlist.com (retrieved: June 2012)
ior parts (Ramsden, 1989b). The early success of the 146 in the
S made BAe the largest RJ producer in the 70–110-seat segment
y 1985. Its production peaked in 1990, but subsequent upgrades
the RJ-70/85/100) extended the production run to 2001 (Fig. 2, left
anel). Fokker followed with a lag, as the high costs of simultaneous
roduct launch (a turboprop commuter along with the F-100) and
xchange-rate volatility led to near insolvency. The Dutch govern-
ent underwrote its debts in 1987. The strong initial sales of the
-100 made Fokker the market leader in RJs in 1991 (Fig. 2, right
anel). However, Fokker’s prices were higher than its newer com-
etitors, while too low to recover production costs. Failing to attract
nvestors or secure another government bailout, Fokker announced
ankruptcy and ceased RJ production in 1996 (Heerkens and Ulijn,
999; Ligterink, 2001).
.3. Leadership changes
Changes in leadership in the RJ industry – measured in terms
f number of aircraft delivered – are shown in Fig. 3. The ﬁrst
eadership change happened in 1995 as Bombardier launched its
0-seat CRJ100/200 Canadian RJs.  Bombardier, a transport equip-
ent manufacturer, entered the aircraft industry through the
cquisition of a number of aerospace companies. It successfully
ransformed a business jet design into the CRJ family, which was
ubsequently stretched to accommodate a hundred passengers
CRJ700/900/1000). With historically unprecedented delivery rates
n the RJ segment, Bombardier produced over 1700 CRJs.
Initially, Bombardier defended its leadership in the 50–70
eat market against the challenge from Embraer, the emerging
ompetitor with experience in turboprop commuter planes. The
7–50-seater ERJ-145/135 launched following the privatization of
mbraer became very successful on the global market, making the
ompany a serious challenger to Bombardier. Embraer gained a sta-
le leadership in new aircraft delivery in 2005 with its radically new
esign, the larger E-Jet family (ERJ-170/190 models) that addressed
he 70–120-seat market. Bombardier’s decision to avoid the above-
00-seat market with a purposely-designed jet appears to have cost
he Canadian ﬁrm its leadership in RJs.
This study aims to explain the factors driving leadership change,
y addressing the following questions: What were the main drivers
f sectoral catch-up and leadership change in the RJ market? WhatPlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
ffected the timing of instances of leadership change? What did
ompanies gaining leadership do differently from incumbents or
ther challengers? The following section outlines the theoretical
ramework and methodology applied. Aerospace (BAe, left) and Fokker (right) (1980–2000).
3. Theoretical framework for leadership dynamics in
aircraft manufacturing
The co-evolution of ﬁrms, technology, demand and institutions
explains industry dynamics (Nelson, 1994) and the competitive-
ness of the aerospace industry (Frenken, 2000). Understanding
industries as sectoral innovation systems (Malerba, 2002) is more
suitable to understand dynamics than theories focusing on ele-
ments of it, such as product or industry life-cycle theories (see Niosi
and Zhegu, 2008). Competitive sectors were found to be associated
with a well-functioning sectoral innovation system, in advanced as
well as emerging economies (Malerba, 2004; Malerba and Mani,
2009; Mowery and Nelson, 1999). Consequently, in the context
of high-tech industries such as aircraft manufacturing, not only
companies but also host governments and local institutions of inno-
vation systems compete for leadership. An adapted version of the
appreciative theorizing framework of Lee and Malerba (2016) is
therefore applicable for our study.
We expect to identify discontinuities in the long-term evo-
lution of innovation systems. Periods of incremental change are
regularly punctuated by fundamental transformations in all their
building blocks: in ﬁrms (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), organi-
zations (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), industries (Tushman and
Anderson, 1986), and the knowledge base (technological paradigm
shifts observed by Freeman and Perez, 1988; Perez and Soete, 1988;
Schumpeter, 1934). Recurrent discontinuities characterized the
evolution of sectoral innovation systems of the aerospace industry
in emerging economies. The long-term competitiveness of a sector
in a country depended on the ability of key system actors (ﬁrms and
governments) to adjust to such discontinuities (Vertesy and Szir-
mai, 2010). Lee and Malerba (2016) suggest that discontinuities in
the various building blocks of innovation systems present windows
of opportunity for latecomer ﬁrms to catch-up with and overtake
incumbent leaders in a sector. However, this theory implies that
in effect, any ﬁrm can become a latecomer and new leader. Given
the high technological and capital entry barriers to this industry,
we argue that, in addition to windows of opportunity and strategic
responses, ‘preconditions’ matter. We discuss below how to inter-
pret these three elements for the RJ industry, and what ﬁndings we
expect regarding leadership change. of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
3.1. Windows of opportunity
Lee and Malerba (2016) distinguished three kinds of windows of
opportunity for challenger companies, corresponding to the build-
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Fig. 3. Regional Jet Deliveries, 3-year moving average (1980–2010).
Note: Delivery dates were obtained from the published lists of www.airlinerlist.com (retrieved: June 2012), the accuracy of which could only be veriﬁed for Bombardier
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cnd  Embraer in the respective Annual Reports. Data excludes business jets, but incl
okker: F-28/-70/-100; Bombardier: CRJ100/-200/-700/-900/-1000; Embraer: ERJ-
iscrepancy between production and delivery dates.
ng blocks of sectoral innovation systems: radical changes in (a)
nowledge and technology, (b) demand conditions, and (c) institu-
ions and regulation.
A radically new technology offers latecomers a window of
pportunity to catch-up with incumbents by leapfrogging (Perez
nd Soete, 1988). Incumbents, with capabilities and investments
ssociated with older technology, are easily trapped. They need
o recover investments over a long production run and are reluc-
ant or inﬂexible in embracing an emerging technology which is
lad in uncertainty and may  destroy existing competences (Arthur,
989; Chandy and Tellis, 1998, 2000; Christensen, 1997; Henderson
nd Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). The commercial
ircraft industry has been described as a “borrower” of tech-
ology developed in the military sector and related industries
Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982). Latecomer RJ makers not involved
n defence-related R&D or production, or those not having devel-
ped the new technology in-house, may  ﬁnd it particularly difﬁcult
o utilize a new technology. They may  face technological, ﬁnan-
ial or political barriers. We  will revisit such cases when discussing
trategic responses and preconditions.
Changes in demand conditions and abrupt changes in busi-
ess cycles affect innovation and production. Economic growth
ncreases demand for new aircraft, provided that ﬁrms have access
o growth markets. Yet, as Mathews (2005) showed, while upturns
reate opportunities for incumbents to expand production in
nvestment-heavy industries, downturns favour latecomers due
o the cleansing effect and the liberation of resources. In the air-
raft industry which is sensitive to operating costs and purchase
rices (Prencipe, 2013), downturns may  shift demand towards new,
ore efﬁcient products. Similarly, demand may  also be affected by
hanging fuel prices. Presumably, price increases put pressure on
irlines to select newer models with lower operating costs, or, prob-
bly to a lesser degree, to select refurbished older models. Declining
uel prices may  offer opportunities for incumbents to extend the
roduction runs of existing models. Changing user preferences,
uch as passengers’ expectations of safety, speed, or comfort, may
lso inﬂuence demand. Interactively, preferences can be shaped by
upply but also by chance events, such as crashes.
Regulatory windows of opportunity come in different forms.
rencipe (2013) distinguishes direct effects, or rules concerning
he certiﬁcation of new aircraft, and indirect effects, regulating thePlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
xploitation of a country’s airspace. Other types of regulatory or
nstitutional windows open with changes in government owner-
hip, after nationalization or privatization. Regulatory changes may
reate restricted windows of opportunity, which can apply selec-he following products: BAe RJ: BAC-111, BAe-146-100/-200/-300, RJ-70/-85/-100;
40/-145/-170/-175/-190/-195. We applied a 3-year moving average to smoothen
tively for certain incumbent and challenger companies, as well as
for the entire sector.
We  next examine three cross-cutting features of windows of
opportunity in the context of the aircraft industry: asymmetry,  tim-
ing and source.  First, the complex structure of the industry and
its products (Dosi et al., 2003; Hobday et al., 2005) implies that
developers and producers may  operate under different political
regimes (Esposito and Raffa, 2007), and so are inﬂuenced by differ-
ent windows of opportunity. We  expect that policy makers create
asymmetric beneﬁts. The question is whether windows of oppor-
tunity triggering leadership change were universally applicable,
or speciﬁc to certain ﬁrms only. Second, we expect that the tim-
ing when windows open matters, considering that an aircraft’s
life cycle encompasses long intervals between development, ﬁrst
delivery and the break-even point. A company reacting too swiftly
(or too slowly) to an emerging opportunity could fail if the win-
dow closes before it recovers the sunk costs. Third, we  expect that
some windows of opportunity are not exogenous to ﬁrm activities.
Some windows, such as economic crises, ﬂuctuations in world fuel
prices or aircraft crashes, arise as random events. However, others
(including regulatory windows) may  result from company activity
or government legislation, or their strategic collaboration. In this
case, we  should ﬁnd evidence of innovation system actors affecting
the nature, timing and length of windows of opportunity.
3.2. Strategic response
Leadership change requires the active role of ﬁrms to recog-
nize opportunities and implement a strategy accordingly (Lee and
Malerba, 2016). Such strategies involve learning, capability accu-
mulation and innovation (Lee and Lim, 2001; Mu  and Lee, 2005).
For clarity, we  distinguish between long- and short-term strategies.
Learning and capability accumulation aims to bridge the difference
between existing capabilities and those presumed to be necessary
to close the productivity gap vis-à-vis the incumbents (Bell and
Pavitt, 1995; Kim, 1980; Lall, 1992). These form part of longer-
term catch-up strategies of late entrants, potentially extending
over decades in the context of the aircraft industry or emerging
economies (Bell and Figueiredo, 2012; Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010).
Over this period, several windows of opportunity open, but ﬁrms of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
lack the necessary preconditions, or capabilities, to respond. We
address this issue in the next sub-section. Here we focus on the
innovation strategies companies pursued, and the strategic role, if
any, that governments played.
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icant companies, including incumbents. Finally, we analyse the
preconditions for catch-up and leadership change from the per-
spectives of the new leader and of other ﬁrms. Fig. 4 provides aARTICLEESPOL-3339; No. of Pages 16
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When an opportunity emerges, innovating ﬁrms decide whether
o develop a new product or make improvements to existing
nes, which market niches to address, and how to manage the
evelopment of a portfolio of new (or improved) products. The
egree of novelty in such complex products may  vary, and may
nvolve changes in the core design concepts and in the architec-
ure (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Innovation strategies rely on
ast R&D activities, human capital and capabilities of the ﬁrm or its
uppliers. Incumbents and latecomers, in advanced or in emerging
conomies, may  all respond to a window of opportunity, but with
ifferent strategies. An incumbent presumably prefers a defensive
trategy of incremental innovation (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) to
ecover sunk costs. By increasing variety, it adjusts to different user
eeds as markets mature (Frenken et al., 1999) – i.e. by replac-
ng engines or limited re-design by stretching or shortening the
ircraft. If new technology originates from component suppliers,
op-tier ﬁrms need to learn about and implement new or improved
odules. Radical innovation − launching a new product (family) to
xploit a market niche – is a costlier strategy. This involves acquir-
ng new competencies and replacing existing ones. Architectural
nd radical innovations are more likely strategies for latecomer
hallengers, but only if they can ﬁnance the learning costs and take
dvantage of technological leapfrogging. Government support may
ower such costs.
There is reason to consider governments as strategic actors in
erospace innovation systems. Strategic trade theory suggests that
ue to the zero-sum competition in this oligopolistic industry, gov-
rnments and ﬁrms act strategically against foreign incumbents
nd challengers to maximize rent (Spencer and Brander, 2008).
ublic policies shape the institutional environment and create
dvantages for ﬁrms in various industries (Nelson, 1995). History
hows that governments effectively supported local ﬁrms, with
irect development support, launch aids or public procurement
Eliasson, 2010). Embraer beneﬁtted from long-term government
upport apart from its ambitious, entrepreneurial management.
or instance, the Brazilian government provided the state-owned
mbraer with access to technology, protected its home mar-
et, ﬁnanced product development (and co-development), and
elped certiﬁcation in key export markets (Cassiolato et al.,
002; Frischtak, 1992, 1994; Moxon, 1987; Ramamurti, 1987;
arathy, 1985). Even after its privatization, Embraer beneﬁt-
ed from a favourable institutional climate and export credits
Goldstein, 2002a,b; Goldstein and McGuire, 2004; Marques and
liveira, 2009). However, governments may  be tempted to pursue
efence-oriented policies and techno-nationalism, disregarding
onsiderations of competitiveness, leading to severe overspending,
s in the cases of the Indonesian (Eriksson, 2003; Hill and Pang Eng,
988; McKendrick, 1992) or Argentine aircraft industries (Hira and
liverira, 2007; Vertesy, 2011).
.3. Preconditions for leadership change
Under perfect competition, any company could in theory
espond to an emerging opportunity. In an evolutionary frame-
ork, path-dependence and technological capabilities limit the set
f potential challengers (Nelson and Winter, 1982), since techno-
ogical advance is cumulative (Nelson, 1994). Furthermore, Perez
nd Soete conditioned their proposition that paradigm transitions
ffer favourable conditions for lagging countries to catch up on the
vailability of “a reasonable level of productive capacity and loca-
ional advantages and a sufﬁcient endowment of qualiﬁed human
esources in the new technologies” (Perez and Soete, 1988). WePlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
im to test whether preconditions matter for leadership change,
nd if so, what kind of capabilities successful new leaders pos-
essed which others lacked, and what role governments played in
ccumulating them. PRESS
 xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5
Preconditions enable companies to effectively respond to
emerging windows of opportunity and gain leadership in this
capital- and technology-intensive sector. These are a set of tech-
nological, organizational and investment capabilities, which ﬁrms
accumulate through a learning process, often spread among actors
in an innovation system. A critical mass of technological capabilities
and absorptive capacity enable them to recognize the value of new
information and implement strategies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Lall, 1992). Management studies have described various capabili-
ties that competitive ﬁrms need, including innovative or dynamic
capabilities (Dutrénit, 2004, 2007; Teece et al., 1997), and the capac-
ity to invest, establish linkages, manage complex production and
innovation networks and meet high quality standards (Dosi et al.,
2003; Hobday et al., 2005). Without threshold capabilities, late-
comer countries’ aerospace industry cannot aspire to leadership
(Baskaran, 2005).
Technological discontinuities can be both competence-
enhancing and competence-destroying (Tushman and Anderson,
1986). In the latter case, ﬁrms need fundamentally new skills
and competences for market success. Hence, existing capabilities
matter less, increasing the chances for latecomer challengers to
grow faster. If technological change is competence-enhancing,
latecomers need to implement long-term strategies for catch-up
and, eventually, leadership change (Lee and Lim, 2001).
The empirical literature on latecomer entry in aircraft pro-
duction since the 1950s suggests that preconditions matter for
success. Successful entry and catch-up was  the outcome of learn-
ing and capability accumulation, which depended on the provision
of skilled personnel and technology from education and research
institutes, as well as access to ﬁnance and foreign markets. Long-
term, industry-friendly innovation and trade policies of their host
governments played a crucial role in both advanced and newly
emerging economies (Baskaran, 2001; Cassiolato et al., 2002;
Goldstein, 2002b; Lukasiewicz, 1986; Mani, 2013; Marques and
Oliveira, 2009; Niosi, 2013; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005, 2010; Texier,
2000; Vertesy, 2011). At the same time, specialization along global
value chains potentially relaxes entry barriers. Entry in the 1980s,
when RJ producers performed many of their activities in-house,5
may  have had higher barriers than in the 1990s when the indus-
try became globally interconnected, as shown by the success of
specialized suppliers from Japan, Mexico and Singapore (Kimura,
2006, 2007; Martínez-Romero, 2013; McGuire, 2007; Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1985; Pang Eng and Hill, 1992; Vertesy, 2013, 2015).
3.4. Methodology
We analyse two cases of leadership change to understand
their salient contributing factors. The main advantage of such a
historical-institutional study is that new leaders and their win-
ner strategies can be clearly identiﬁed retrospectively, along with
the relevant windows. For a complete explanation of leadership
dynamics, we  also discuss the strategies and preconditions of “oth-
ers”: potential challengers and failed incumbents.6
In each case study, we ﬁrst present the windows of opportu-
nity deemed relevant for leadership changes, and then discuss the
strategies of new leaders alongside the strategies of other signif- of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
5 Some may  distinguish a “less mature” and “more mature” state of the indus-
try  before and after 1990. However, this is debatable because the aircraft industry
retained the dominant design of the jet age (cf. Frenken and Leydesdorff, 2000), a
key sign of maturity.
6 This may  be a second-best option to a counter-factual analysis.
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new city-pairs offered efﬁciency increases. Given the opportu-Fig. 4. Diagram of
ource: author.
chematic overview linking the various elements of our leadership
ynamics framework.
Leadership in the RJ industry can be deﬁned in various ways.
iven our sectoral innovation system approach, technology is con-
idered one (important) factor among others that contribute to
 ﬁrm’s market performance. Aircraft manufacturing is a high-
ech industry where competitive companies are technologically
dvanced and innovative. The ultimate success of any innovation
s measured by its commercialization (Mowery and Nelson, 1999),
o we focus on market performance. Measuring market leadership
s challenging. Companies can be compared in terms of turnover or
roductivity, number and value of new orders or deliveries. It is dif-
cult to single out turnover related to RJs speciﬁcally, given that RJs
re one among many business lines of the companies examined.7
t is equally difﬁcult to obtain information on aircraft sales value,
iven the secretive practice of offering airline-speciﬁc discounts.
uantity of new aircraft delivered is an accepted measure of mar-
et success of a top-tier company. Typically, only aircraft with a
edicated buyer are manufactured, and such ﬁgures reﬂect actual
emand better than the cancellation-prone reports of new orders
Heerkens et al., 2010).
The rich techno-managerial literature on the aircraft industry
s useful for qualitative, historical analyses. Articles on the busi-
ess and political landscape, interviews with corporate leaders
nd descriptions of new products offer valuable sources on capa-
ilities, innovations and strategies. These allow one to chart the
volution of technology, ﬁrms and market conditions, identify-
ng windows of opportunity and understanding innovation and
arketing strategies. Newspapers and trade journals, e.g. Flight
nternational, Aviation Today, or Financial Times, have served as
n input to other studies on the aircraft industry (Cooke andPlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
hret, 2009; Frischtak, 1992; Goldstein, 2002b, 2006). When cross-
alidated, these sources can be more reliable than others, such as
urvey data. In addition, we use aircraft delivery statistics com-
7 Most RJ producers have stakes in the defence or corporate jet industry. Moreover,
s  Ligterink (2001) shows, accounting practices can easily hide relevant ﬁnancial
nformation.etical framework.
piled by Airlinerlist.com (an independent data collection website of
aviation enthusiasts) and from Annual Reports of the companies.8
4. Bombardier’s leadership in the 50-seat segment
(1995–2005)
4.1. Windows of opportunity
The various windows of opportunity that proved instrumental
for Bombardier’s assumption of leadership opened up in different
forms over a long period. First, continuous technological improve-
ments in jet engines rendered ever-smaller RJs economically viable,
offering “technological windows”. In comparison with the 3:1
bypass ratio of the Rolls Royce Tay engine Fokker selected for the
F-100, General Electric’s new CF-34 engine family introduced in the
mid-1980s offered a bypass ratio of over 5:1 (Table 1) and a greater
thrust-to-weight ratio. Additionally, the diffusion of information
and communication technologies (ICTs) by the 1990s improved
efﬁciency for managing large companies (Esposito and Raffa, 2007)
and for optimizing airlines’ booking systems.
Second, the “demand window” for smaller jets remained open
throughout the 1980s. The 100-seat jets of BAe and Fokker already
proved the business case for replacing turboprop service with
smaller jets. The established hub-and-spoke system (relying mostly
on turboprops) in the United States connected a previously unseen
number of communities to hub airports. Hubs were in competition,
and RJ service made it possible to increase their reach and their
market share. The thriving commuter market, however, caused
congestion at hubs and a longer travel time in comparison with
point-to-point travel. Introducing jets on feeder routes and for of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
nity to choose, passengers preferred jets which they perceived as
safer, more modern and more comfortable than turboprops (Bryant,
8 In some cases, we found minor differences between the various sources on the
quantity of aircraft delivered in a year, typically due to the mismatch between the
ﬁnancial and calendar years, but none that would signiﬁcantly affect the timing of
the observed leadership change.
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Table 1
Technological and market performance of leading regional jets.
Manufacturer
(family)
Aircraft RJ Market Maximum seats In serial
production
No. Produceda Maximum rangeb
nm (km)
Turbofan Engine
Type
Engine bypass
ratio
Max. cruise
speed Mach
(km/h)
Cabin Width
(m)
British Aerospace/
BAe Systems
(BAe-146 fam.)
BAe-146-100 70/120-seat 94 1983–1992 35 1620 nm (3000 km) 4x Textron
Lycoming ALF 502R
5.7:1 M 0.72 (760 km/h) 3.42 m
BAe-146-200 70/120-seat 112 1983–1993 98 1600 nm (2963 km)  M 0.72 (760 km/h) 3.42 m
BAe-146-300 70/120-seat 128 1988–1998 60 1520 nm (2817 km)  M 0.72 (760 km/h) 3.42 m
BAe/Avro
(RJ70/100  fam.)
RJ70 70/120-seat 94 1993–1996 12 1660 nm (3075 km)  4x Honeywell
LF-507
5.3:1 M 0.73 (788 km/h) 3.42 m
RJ85  70/120-seat 112 1993–2002 87 1780 nm (3295 km)  M 0.73 (788 km/h) 3.42 m
RJ100  70/120-seat 118 1999–2002 71 1780 nm (3295 km)  M 0.73 (788 km/h) 3.42 m
Fokker
(F70/100  fam.)
F-100 70/120-seat 122 1988–1996 276 1450 nm (2685 km)  2x Rolls Royce
RB.183 Tay
3.04:1 M 0.77 (844 km/h) 3.1 m
F-70  70/120-seat 85 1995–1997 45 1780 nm (3295 km)  M 0.77 (844 km/h) 3.1 m
Bombardier
(CRJ  fam.)
CRJ200 50-seat 50 1992- 1100 1585 nm (2936 km) 2x General Electric
CF34-3B
6.2:1 M 0.81 (860 km/h) 2.53 m
CRJ700  70/120-seat 78 2001- 331 1504 nm (2785 km)  2x General Electric
CF34-8C
5:1 M 0.85 (876 km/h) 2.57 m
CRJ900  70/120-seat 90 2003- 274 1515 nm (2806 km)  M 0.83 (885 km/h) 2.57 m
CRJ1000 70/120-seat 104 2010- 19 1622 nm (3004 km) M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.57 m
Embraer
(E145  fam.)
ERJ-145 50-seat 50 1996- 701 2000 nm (3706 km) Rolls-Royce AE
3007-A1
5:1 M 0.78 (830 km/h) 2.10 m
ERJ-135 30/50-seat 37 1999- 108 1750 nm (3243 km)  M 0.78 (830 km/h) 2.10 m
ERJ-140 30/50-seat 44 2001- 74 1650 nm (3058 km)  M 0.78 (830 km/h) 2.10 m
Embraer
(E-Jet  fam.)
ERJ-170 70/120-seat 80 2004- 178 2100 nm (3889 km)  2x General Electric
CF34-8E
5:1 M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m
ERJ-175 70/120-seat 88 2005- 143 2000 nm (3706 km) M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m
ERJ-190 70/120-seat 114 2005- 386 2400 nm (4448 km)  2x General Electric
CF34-10E
5:1 M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m
ERJ-195 70/120-seat 122 2006- 88 2200 nm (4077 km)  M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m
Source: Own compilation based on manufacturers’ website, airliners.net and ﬂightglobal.com.
a Number produced by Dec 2011; commercial variants only, ﬁgures exclude business, cargo and defence derivatives.
b For long range variants.
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Fig. 5. Number and types of regional jets delivered by Bombardier in contrast with incumbents (1990–2011).
N 0–100
S
1
t
o
d
r
a
t
p
p
f
m
p
i
s
o
m
p
e
n
a
s
n
t
r
R
a
4
l
l
m
b
r
d
u
s
l
F
a
(
s
p
by relying on risk-sharing partnerships and focusing on core com-
petencies in system assembly and marketing. Its partnerships
ensured sufﬁcient capacity to meet large-scale orders, a key advan-ote: CRJ-100/200-700 served the 50–70-seat segment; CRJ-900-1000 served the 9
ource: www.airlinerlist.com (retrieved: Jun 2012); Bombardier Annual Reports.
994). Growth in Western Europe due to closer economic integra-
ion also boosted demand for air travel over shorter distances.
An additional combination of demand and regulatory windows
pened in the 1990s, rewarding ﬁrst movers. The early 1990s saw
eclining military spending after the end of the Cold War, global
ecession resulting in capital shortage and a long wave of mergers
nd acquisitions for aircraft producers, and strong price compe-
ition for new aircraft (USITC, 1998). Following the Gulf War, oil
rices were low and in constant decline (Fig. 1), improving the
rospects for RJs. Global expansion of air transport posed a demand
or RJs offering more frequent feeder connections. In Europe, the
arket was opening up towards the former Eastern Bloc. Highly
ublicized turboprop crashes in the US in 1994 and 1995 (involv-
ng an ATR-72 and a BAe Jetstream) pushed preferences towards jet
ervices. In parallel, “scope clauses” introduced in the US turned
ut to offer a crucial regulatory window. Scope clauses were agree-
ents meant to defend the higher wages of larger legacy airlines’
ilots against the lower wages paid by regional airlines, which were
stablished or subcontracted to serve feeder routes and gained sig-
iﬁcant market share in domestic air transport. In order to keep
 cap on the “upward extension” of relatively cheaper commuter
ervices, pilot unions and airlines agreed that subcontractors would
ot ﬂy aircraft over 50 seats. Scope clauses in the early 1990s effec-
ively barred existing RJs with 70-seats from a large part of the
egional market, but boosted producers of smaller, 50-seat jets.
ather than buying modernized turboprops, given lower fuel price,
irlines opted for RJs (Thomas, 2012).
.2. Strategic response
Expectations about the economic viability of 50-seat jets for
ess-than-500-nautical-miles routes divided manufacturers. In the
ate 1980s, many European producers with a stake in the commuter
arket bet on turboprops. RJs were estimated to offer a 15-min
lock time advantage over a 200-nautical-mile trip (typical 50-seat
oute), but at double the fuel costs of turboprops. The estimated
evelopment costs of a new RJ, about a billion US dollars, seemed
nlikely to be ever recovered (Middleton, 1989).
Bombardier became the leader in RJs by creating the 50-
eat market, rather than competing with incumbents in their
arger size classes. Bombardier’s strategy rested on two  pillars.
irst, it accumulated technology and production capacity throughPlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
cquisition. Bombardier, the producer of transport equipment
snowmobiles, locomotives and light rail transit) decided to diver-
ify into aerospace by acquiring troubled companies with advanced
roducts. It acquired (1) the business jet maker Canadair from the-seat market segment.
Canadian government in 1986, (2) the historical British component
supplier (and potential competitor) Shorts in 1989, (3) the business
jet producer Learjet in 1990, and (4) with help from the Province of
Ontario in 1992, de Havilland, specialized in turboprop commuters.
Bombardier could offer a range of related products, including busi-
ness jets, commuters, and components (DePalma, 1998). Second,
it simultaneously launched the Learjet and Global Express busi-
ness jets, the closely related 50-seat Canadair CRJ regional jet, and
the 70–80-seat Dash 8–400 turboprop, all targeting niche mar-
kets. Bombardier found various ways to reduce costs and lower
sales prices. It consolidated the indebted companies and intro-
duced a new management system. Product similarities reduced
manufacturing costs. The CRJ design relied heavily on the Canadair
Challenger business jet. By stretching fuselage and wings, adding
additional exits and making smaller modiﬁcations to subsystems
to meet airline standards, Bombardier kept development costs at
about a third the costs of a clean-sheet design. Apart from using
the conglomerate’s own  funds, Bombardier received repayable
loans from the federal and the Quebec governments to ﬁnance
development.9 All this reduced development time: design began
at the end of 1987, while the ﬁrst CRJ ﬂew in 1991, and was
delivered in 1992 to Lufthansa CityLine. Orders from regional sub-
sidiaries of major US and European airlines rapidly increased, and
soon Bombardier was  increasing production capacity. A “second
set” of windows of opportunity described above (lower fuel prices,
application of scope clauses, overall efﬁciency gains and, turboprop
crashes in the US) boosted demand for the 50-seat jet segment
(Fig. 5). By 1996, when Embraer’s 50-seat ERJ-145 jet entered the
market, the competitive landscape had changed signiﬁcantly. RJ
deliveries had overtaken turboprops in the 50-seat market (Fig. 6),
and European RJ producers were losing out in the strong price com-
petition. European aircraft were signiﬁcantly more expensive due
to strong currencies and less efﬁcient production. Furthermore, the
smallest models (the F-70 and BAe’s RJ70) were exceeding the scope
clause limitations in the US. When demand for larger RJs increased
again towards the end of the decade, Bombardier siphoned off sales
by launching the stretched derivative CRJ-700.
Bombardier could also limit development and production costs of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
9 28% of the 275 million CAD project was government ﬁnanced (see Warwick,
1991).
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Fig. 6. Size and type competition in the regional market.
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okker  and Saab models in the 50 (40–60) and 70–110 seat category.
age over many competitors, including Fokker.10 The introduction
f the “Bombardier Manufacturing System” offered cost, time and
pace optimization thanks to computerizing the workﬂow and
ogistics, and improved efﬁciency (MacDonald, 2012). The fact that
t produced more RJs in a year than any of its competitors had before
nd kept its global market leadership for almost a decade following
996 (Fig. 5) shows the success of Bombardier’s strategy.
Both incumbents (in the 100-seat RJ market) chose to sell
urboprops for the 50-seat market.11 They knew well the tight com-
etition these aircraft were facing. The French-Italian ATR-42 was
lready launched in 1984. Saab started to develop a 58-seater tur-
oprop (Saab-2000) after recognizing rising demand for its 34-seat
F-340 (jointly built with Fairchild). Notwithstanding the memory
f the failure of its VFW-614 44-seat jet in the 1970s,12 Fokker was
lready involved in parallel product developments which it strug-
led to ﬁnance. Its room for strategic manoeuvring was limited by
ts size and liquidity position, and the history of the F-100 and F-
0 were marked by many crises. It only survived a liquidity crisis
owards the end of the development phase in 1987 with the help
f a government bailout. The higher-than-expected development
osts for two parallel programs added to other problems. It ended
he F-27 and F-28 production to free up engineering capacity, but
his reduced its cash ﬂow. The low value of the US dollar and high
xchange-rate volatility13 caused Fokker structural ﬁnancial prob-
ems, given its high US dollar exposure: its revenues were in dollars,
ut costs in Dutch guilders (Ligterink, 2001). Cost-cutting measures
id not increase its proﬁtability, but decreased capacity. Access toPlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
nance proved difﬁcult at a time of global aerospace mergers and
hakeouts. A takeover by DASA offered only a temporary solution
10 Interestingly, Shorts, the company acquired by Bombardier, was  a component
upplier of Fokker, giving not only a productive, but also a strategic asset to Bom-
ardier.
11 Fokker’s F-50 (an F-27 derivative) took off in 1985, and serial production started
n  1987; BAe’s ATP entered production in 1988, and Jetstream 41, a stretched version
f  the 1980s model, entered into service in 1992.
12 This unique design performed poorly and was cancelled in 1977. Its engine tech-
ology was inefﬁcient and unreliable, and increasing fuel prices dimmed its business
rospects.
13 Between 1985 and 1996, the Dutch currency ﬂuctuated between 3.7 and 1.5 NLG
o  a USD with an overall declining trend.ircraft. Data covers all ATR, Boeing/MDD, Bombardier, British Aerospace, Embraer,
to its ﬁnancial problems, Fokker announced bankruptcy in 1996
(Heerkens and Ulijn, 1999).
Interestingly, the British company Short Brothers also consid-
ered launching a radically new 48-seater jet, the FJX (Ramsden,
1989a). However, the FJX never progressed beyond the concept
phase after Bombardier acquired the company in 1989, recognizing
it as not only a potential supplier but also a competitor. Other Euro-
pean smaller aircraft producers struggled in a lethal competition in
the 1990s. Collaboration took place only for LCA in the framework of
the Airbus consortium, which absorbed signiﬁcant resources. Air-
bus, like Boeing, was  uninterested in the more price-sensitive RJ
market. Saab, despite its experience in producing turboprops and
ﬁghter jets, never decided to invest in developing RJs. Evidently,
the low fuel prices came to the detriment of the turboprop market,
which witnessed the exit of old European incumbents (Saab, BAe
and Fokker), where only the Franco-Italian ATR consortium sur-
vived. Dornier, a Germany-based Fairchild subsidiary, recognized
the opportunities and launched the Do-328JET by equipping its 30-
seat turboprop with jet engines. However, the aircraft entering in
1999 trailed its overseas competitors in performance and costs.14
The only other successful contender already in 50-seat RJs was
Embraer. The Brazilian state-owned enterprise already launched a
design in 1989, but was  severely delayed by ﬁnancial problems and
the difﬁculty in ﬁnding partners. Only after Embraer’s privatiza-
tion did the 50-seat ERJ-145 program take off, four years later than
Bombardier’s CRJ. Its early-1990s crisis gave a head-start to Bom-
bardier, but Embraer quickly caught up thanks to the strong design
and competitive price of the ERJ-145. This beneﬁtted from public
support for 22% of development costs and the interest-rate equal-
ization scheme PROEX (Goldstein, 2002a). Considering it illegal,
Bombardier pushed the Canadian government to challenge Brazil’s
ﬁnancing practices at the WTO.
4.3. Preconditions for bombardier’s leadership of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
Canada’s sectoral innovation system in aerospace had accumu-
lated a very strong knowledge base over the preceding decades.
The National Research Council had ﬁnanced fundamental research
14 Nevertheless, the Do-328JET remains the most signiﬁcant European competitor
in  the RJ market, with 110 aircraft delivered.
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offered signiﬁcant ﬂexibility improvement and cost reduction.21
Although the new, larger E-jets were clean-sheet designs, they
shared in-family commonalities and some degree of commonalitiesARTICLEESPOL-3339; No. of Pages 16
0 D. Vértesy / Research
ince the 1950s, developed gas turbines and offered wind tunnel
ests (Niosi et al., 2000).15 Aerospace ﬁrms were among the largest
anadian R&D spenders with a revealed comparative advantage.
he Montreal and Toronto clusters (hosting companies such as
ombardier, Bell Textron, Pratt & Whitney, and Honeywell) were
trong in aircraft, parts and components (including engines) devel-
pment and manufacturing, relying on highly skilled scientists
nd engineers (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). Bombardier had access
o the resources of both the Canadian and US aerospace innova-
ion systems, thanks to its acquired subsidiaries and to the strong
ies between the Canadian and US aerospace industries. Canadian
rms have been eligible for US government contracts since 1959
nd have maintained intensive technology- and market-oriented
lobal collaborations (Anderson, 1995; Niosi and Zhegu, 2010).
urthermore, Bombardier could draw from its own  managerial
xperience in running complex organizations. Perhaps the best
ndicator for its technological capabilities and market knowledge is
hat Bombardier’s subsidiaries had already delivered over 450 DHC
ommuter aircraft and over 200 Canadair business jets by 1990
although none were market leaders). Its successful other busi-
ess lines and the supportive regional and federal governments
rovided Bombardier with strong investment capacity. Canadian
xporters could beneﬁt from repayable loans of the Export Devel-
pment Corporation (Goldstein and McGuire, 2004).
Industry leaders, including MDD, Boeing and Airbus also pos-
essed the technological and ﬁnancial capabilities to produce RJs –
ad they wanted to enter the market. BAe and Fokker, “entrapped”
s described above, lacked the necessary capital. Other companies
acked crucial capabilities. Russian ﬁrms inheriting the Soviet tech-
ology base had to face a brain-drain and an institutional crisis of
he Russian innovation system. In Indonesia, IPTN, a co-producer
nd co-designer of turboprop transport aircraft lacked the experi-
nce to design, produce and market jets, and could not draw on
 well-established innovation system. Embraer, a commuter pro-
ucer, still needed certain technological capabilities to design and
roduce RJs, and struggled under the lingering effect of a ﬁnan-
ial crisis and slow decision-making due to its state ownership
Frischtak, 1992). Until its privatization in 1994, it lacked the capac-
ty to ﬁnance the launch a 50-seat jet, or to enter into joint ventures
iving access to missing technologies and funds.
. Embraer’s leadership in the 70–120-seat segment (2005-)
.1. Windows of opportunity
By the late 1990s, increasing fuel prices made 50-seat jets
ostlier to operate, shifting demand towards larger RJs (Fig. 1). Cost
ompetition intensiﬁed with the entry of new, low-cost carriers.
odern turboprops or larger RJs offered lower fuel consumption
er seat and greater efﬁciency. Economic reality forced major US
irlines to gradually re-negotiate scope clauses from 50 to 70
eats, and beyond.16 Major producers became optimistic about
he prospects of the 100-seat segment once again. Boeing foresaw
17Please cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
emand for 3006 new aircraft until 2020 driven by income and
opulation growth in emerging markets and by the need to replace
ging narrow-bodies (B-727s and DC-9s) in America and Europe.
lder models were more costly to operate, and states imposed
15 The NRC’s National Aeronautics Establishment of 1958 operated the only wind-
unnel in Canada and supported the design of all aircraft and engine models for over
 decade, including the wing designs of De Havilland (Niosi et al., 2000).
16 “Scope Clauses and New Regional Jets – A Coming Storm?” AirInsight, 3 May
013.
17 Values refer to the 90–120-seat range (Boeing, 2001); Embraer’s – probably
trategically – more cautious forecast estimated 1650 (Embraer, 2001). PRESS
 xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
stricter noise regulations.18 Airlines recognized the potential of
reducing aircraft size to around 100 from the typical 150–180 seat
range which allowed more frequent direct services, and new city-
pair connections (USITC, 1998).
“Technological windows” for the RJ industry appeared more
subtly in this period. Specialized second- and third-tier suppli-
ers offered incremental improvements in jet engines, avionics, and
composite materials allowing further efﬁciency gains. In parallel,
improvements in the aviation infrastructure (in air navigation ser-
vices, air trafﬁc management) helped accommodate the growing
air trafﬁc and allow more economical operations.
Market volatility in the 2000s (after 9/11 and the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis) made liquidity a major concern for airlines, forcing tradi-
tional airlines to consider ﬂying larger RJs instead of 150-seat LCAs.
Larger RJs offered the ﬂexibility of greater frequency at times of
boom, and an efﬁcient way to defend network spread when demand
dropped. While the smallest RJs beneﬁtted from low fuel prices
and strict scope clauses in the 1990s, increasing fuel prices, mar-
ket volatility and relaxed scope clauses opened a window for the
70–120-seat RJ segment in the 2000s (Table 1).
5.2. Strategic response
Towards the turn of the millennium, the RJ industry was  poised
to become overcrowded, as European and American incumbents
and Asian newcomers announced plans to re-engine existing mod-
els, resize existing models, or develop new designs (Doyle et al.,
2000).
Embraer’s winning innovation strategy was  to introduce a new
family – with new product architecture and changes in its modules.
Already at the height of the ERJ-135/145 (50-seat RJ) production
cycle, Embraer recognized and explicitly targeted the emerging
niche in the 70–110-seat market.19 When launching the new, larger
“E-Jet” family (the ERJ-170/190), the company built on its 30-
year experience in producing for the global commuter market,
as well as from its risk-sharing partnerships already established
during the mid-1990s. In a strong ﬁnancial and negotiating posi-
tion after the success of the ERJ-135/145 family, Embraer could
reduce the number of partners to optimize costs, and attract some
of them to Brazil. Embraer took a 45% stake in the new, larger
E-Jet programme, while the rest was shared among the 16 part-
ners (Figueiredo et al., 2008).20 A few months after the launch of
the larger E-Jets in 1999, 20% of Embraer’s shares (with no vot-
ing rights) were sold to a group of French aerospace ﬁrms, EADS,
Dassault, Thomson-CSF and Snecma. Embraer, with government
backing, strategically selected the investors offering in exchange
stronger perspectives for future ﬁghter jet procurement and better
access to the Latin American military market. As a direct implication
of the change in ownership, Embraer implemented Dassault’s state-
of-the-art computer aided design and manufacturing systems, a
powerful virtual reality platform for co-development, all of which of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
18 In effect, banning old aircraft from operating in Western airspace. As a temporary
alternative, some operators opted for noise reduction kits (“hush kits”), while others
pushed manufacturers to re-engine existing models.
19 See the “70/110 rule” strategy (Embraer, 2005).
20 Its main partners were GE, the single producer of engines (a package worth
around 20% of the plane price), Honeywell (a GE subsidiary) responsible for avionics,
and Gamesa of Spain responsible for the tail section and rear fuselage. Liebherr
supplied the landing gear and Kawasaki Heavy Industries of Japan was  in charge of
parts of the wing control surfaces made using composite materials and pylons.
21 For details of the strategic deal, see Moxon and Lewis (1999), Autry (1999),
Cassiolato et al. (2002) and Goldstein (2002a).
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ith its predecessors to further reduce costs (Norris et al., 2004).
 crucial source of efﬁciency gains came from selecting an engine
eveloped speciﬁcally for the new E-Jet family (the General Electric
FM34-8E and −10E).22
Embraer swiftly launched a full family of aircraft. The 80-seater
RJ-170 ﬁrst ﬂew in February 2002 and was certiﬁed and deliv-
red to the launch customer two years later. A slightly stretched
ersion with 88 seats, the ERJ-175 was introduced a year later,
ollowed by the 110-seater ERJ-190 and the 122-seater ERJ-195,
oth offering redesigned wings and greater engine thrust (Table 1).
he American low-cost carrier JetBlue became the launch customer
ith an order of 99 and option for another 100 planes (Cameron,
005). The new, larger E-Jets directly competed not only with the
argest members of the BAe RJ100, but also with the smallest Air-
us and Boeing models.23 By 2005, Embraer overtook Bombardier
n terms of RJ delivery rate (Fig. 7). The sources of competitiveness
or Embraer’s products were its sales and operating costs. Operating
osts were relatively low because the plane was the most modern
nd was speciﬁcally designed for this market. Lower labour costs
n Brazil had only a limited effect on the prices,24 since Embraer’s
ircraft are overwhelmingly (90%) produced outside Brazil (despite
fforts to increase the local share). Publicly funded export credits
layed an important role in Embraer’s success (although to a lesser
egree after the settlement of the WTO  dispute between Brazil and
anada).
Embraer invested in production capacity to meet demand. In
001, it established new activities in the Sao José dos Campos
erospace cluster (also home to the research and training institutes
TA and ITA, and to many of Embraer’s suppliers) specializing in
mall parts development and engineering. It opened an in-house,
ostgraduate school training future aircraft designers and trans-
erred military and executive jet assembly aircraft to Botucatu.
ith the primary aim to access the Chinese market, Embraer jointly
pened with AVIC II a facility to assemble its outgoing ERJ–145s in
arbin in 2002. By April 2012, 41 ERJ-145’s had been produced
ere (Fleury and Fleury, 2011). China later rejected Embraer’s plan
o assemble E–190 s locally, possibly to protect the market for its
indigenous” ARJ-21, although Embraer sold the type to Chinese air-
ines. A 2011 agreement extended the production of the executive
et derivative of the ERJ-145 in Harbin.25
The 70–120-seat jet market had several incumbents that failed
o remain or become leaders. BAe re-engined and modernized the
Ae-146 family in 1993 and marketed them as Avro RJs with some
uccess. However, high production and operating costs (owing to
he four-engine design) put pressure on the company to make
urther improvements. BAe Systems26 eventually made the less
mbitious choice to sell the yet again re-engined Avro RJs as RJ-Xs,
ut interest in what was  by then effectively a 30-year-old designPlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
as low and the company exited from the RJ industry in 2002
Kingsley-Jones, 2006).27
22 Introducing a new engine entails substantial R&D. Commonalities with the
FM34 family and the fact that development was  already launched for the aban-
oned Dornier 728 program helped Embraer reduce the lead-time (Norris, 2003).
23 Despite speculations that the aim of a 1999 acquisition of 20% of Embraer’s
hares by European aerospace investors (including Airbus-owner EADS) was to limit
ts  room for strategic manoeuver, no evidence emerged to substantiate any hostility.
ventually Airbus-owner EADS sold its stake in 2007 (Done, 2007).
24 Although they were certainly lower than those of Fairchild Dornier, its potential
avaria-based competitor.
25 As a comparison, Bombardier’s strategy was  to manufacture parts of the Q400
nd the CSeries aircraft in China, but realized fewer RJ sales than Embraer.
26 The company formed with the merger of BAe and Marconi Electronic Systems
n 1999.
27 Interesting to add, that the company re-focused its activities as defence producer
nd component supplier, and remained one of the largest aerospace ﬁrms. PRESS
 xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 11
Boeing and Airbus chose a cautious strategy to cover the 100-
seat jet market by selling shortened aircraft in their existing
families to reduce development and marketing costs. How-
ever, these aircraft were derivatives of planes optimized for the
150–180-seats size, and the one-family-ﬂeet advantages offered to
network carriers could not offset their relatively higher operating
costs. Boeing tried to market two  aircraft: the 117-seat B-717 it
inherited from MDD, and the 737-600, the smallest member of the
successful 737 family. Sales performance was mediocre for both
models until Boeing de-listed them in 2006. Airbus offered the less
successful A-318, the smallest in the A-320 family for the same
segment. An attempt to co-develop a smaller aircraft with Ale-
nia, AVIC and Singapore Technologies Aerospace (the AE31x) failed
due to insufﬁcient capabilities of partners and to concerns about
transferring technology to China (Moxon and Lewis, 1998).
Bombardier chose a similar strategy of incremental change to
meet demand in the 70–100-seat class. It further stretched the
CRJ700 to the −900/-1000 models, reaching the limits of the origi-
nal design. Bombardier seriously considered introducing a radically
new aircraft, the BRJ-X. However, in 2000, it shelved the design,
ﬁnding the billion-dollar development costs to be an order of mag-
nitude greater than stretching the CRJs (Lewis, 2000), and being
reluctant to challenge the powerful incumbents in the LCA segment.
Only after Embraer introduced its new E-Jet series did Bombardier
revisit the idea. Technological challenges and a lack of orders
severely delayed the subsequent development of the radically new
100–150-seat CSeries RJ, and it ﬁrst ﬂew only in 2013. In effect, due
to the strategic choices of incumbents, Embraer became the sole
producer for the 100–120-seat segment.
Four other challengers also tried launching a new design. Two
of them, AVIC/Comac and IPTN/DSTP of Indonesia (with the DSTP
2130), lacked the necessary preconditions (Vertesy, 2011). Comac’s
100-seat ARJ-21 successfully took off in 2008 after prolonged devel-
opment, but missing FAA certiﬁcation limited its export potential.
Fairchild Dornier, the small producer of 32-seat jets, turned out
to be the most serious contender to the E-Jets. The radically new
728/928 family was developed to address the 70–110 seat range.
Fairchild Dornier had already constructed static test models and
had collected signiﬁcant amount of orders by 2002 (Lewis, 2002).
But the 9/11 crisis intensiﬁed competition between Embraer and
Dornier, and the Bavaria-based company, with low sales revenues,
underestimated the development costs of the aircraft (which would
have underperformed the ERJ-170/190s), and it ﬁled for bankruptcy
in 2002 (Kappl, 2002).28 Ironically, both Embraer and Bombardier
beneﬁtted from taking over unsatisﬁed orders. In 2000, the Russian
Sukhoi launched its Superjet (SSJ) program in collaboration with the
Italian Alenia. After delays the ﬁrst SSJ ﬂew in 2008, and commer-
cial operations started in 2011. With a seating capacity of 108, the
largest SSJ (the SU-100/95) directly competes with the ERJ-190. Its
initial sales were limited to the CIS market due to lack of trust,
exacerbated by the crash of a demo ﬂight in 2011 (Kramer, 2011).
However, the recent European and American certiﬁcation offers
future growth potential.
5.3. Preconditions for Embraer’s leadership
Embraer gradually accumulated experience in the design, of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
assembly and marketing of propeller-driven, pressurized regional-
scale commercial aircraft and ground-attack jets following its
establishment in 1969. Brazil had a long history in aircraft pro-
28 Many competitors, including Bombardier, considered a take-over to continue
the  728/928 development, but found the one-billion-dollars estimated development
costs excessive. The German or other governments were unable to provide ﬁnancial
support.
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Fig. 7. Number and types of annual regional jet deliveries by Embraer in contrast with Bombardier (1995–2011).
Note:  ERJ-170/175 served the 80–90-seat segment; ERJ-190/195 served the 100–120-seat market segment. In the text, in combination we refer to all four aircraft (ERJ-170
through ERJ-195) as the ‘E-Jets’, distinguishing them from the smaller ERJ-135/145 family.
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uction and aeronautical research. The publicly ﬁnanced research
nd training institute ITA and the technological research organiza-
ion CTA were the backbone of the emerging Brazilian aerospace
nnovation system (Marques, 2004). Embraer, a CTA spinoff, culti-
ated an entrepreneurial culture, but also beneﬁtted from public
upport. This combination was crucial to overcoming the techno-
ogical and market barriers facing a newcomer from an emerging
conomy. The government strategically ﬁnanced development,
rovided access to technology, protected the nascent market (by
trategically selecting partners while excluding competition from
thers) and facilitated access to export markets (Ramamurti, 1987;
ilva, 2002). The CTA-designed Bandeirante, a 20-seat turboprop
nd its 30-seater upgrade, the Brasilia, became successful export
roducts, with a total of 500 and over 350 being produced over
he 1970s-1980s, respectively. Embraer developed capabilities to
esign a jet trainer in the 1980s when cooperating with the Ital-
an Alenia and Aermacchi. While the state-owned model facilitated
he emergence of Embraer, it became a burden after a politi-
al and ﬁnancial crisis hit Brazil. In order to survive the new
ompetitive landscape, the industry had to be fundamentally reor-
anized (Cassiolato et al., 2002; Frischtak, 1992, 1994; Marques,
004). Embraer’s privatization29 in 1994 brought about a major
estructuring of the company and a fundamental institutional
hange in the Brazilian aircraft innovation system (Vertesy and
zirmai, 2010). The new private structure allowed more efﬁcient
ecision-making. The company repositioned its core competence
n co-design, system integration, sales and after-sales support.
mbraer could access funding and advanced technology through
isk-sharing partnerships (Figueiredo et al., 2008) and was able to
ttract new shareholders, even if the domestic supply chain was
eak. By the year 2000, delivery rates of the ERJ-135/145 family
xceeded that of Bombardier’s comparable CRJ200, proving the suc-
ess of the long-term catch-up strategy. The resulting revenue ﬂows
nabled Embraer to ﬁnance the development of the E-Jet family.
razil’s supportive industrial and export policy further facilitated
lobal sales. For this, a one-billion-dollar credit line from the Brazil-
an Development Bank BNDES and the PROEX export-ﬁnancing
cheme (offering interest rate equalization for buyers, but trigger-Please cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
ng the above-mentioned WTO  dispute) proved instrumental.
Other challengers failed to introduce 70–120-seat RJs swiftly
ue to insufﬁcient preconditions. IPTN/DSTP lacked necessary
29 Buyers included Brazilian and US-based non-aerospace sector investors, while
he government retained a golden share in Embraer.resources to ﬁnance the development. The 2130 RJ would have
meant a major step from previous technological achievements,
and the Indonesian aerospace innovation system was underdevel-
oped (McKendrick, 1992). Chinese producers, despite seemingly
abundant funding and access to foreign suppliers, lacked prior
experience in developing and marketing a commercial jet. The
inefﬁcient innovation system made the development process
lengthy. Comac had to accumulate technological capabilities on the
way, slowed down by the complex ownership and management
structure (Vertesy, 2011). Fairchild Dornier possessed strong tech-
nological and management capabilities, and the German and US
sectoral innovation systems were very strong. However, due to its
location, the development costs exceeded the ﬁnancial capacity of
the company and its investors, and Dornier received little targeted
ﬁnancial support from the German government.
6. Conclusions
Windows of opportunity and strategic responses explain to
a large extent why and how incumbents failed and challengers
succeeded in taking leadership in RJ manufacturing. In addition,
preconditions explain why so many challengers failed to become
leaders. This section synthesizes the pattern of leadership change
emerging from the case studies and how each of the three elements
of the framework contributed to it. For an outline of the key sources
of leadership change, see Table 2.
6.1. Windows of opportunity
We  found all three types of windows of opportunity instrumen-
tal for leadership change. Challenger companies beneﬁted from the
availability of new technology on the market, such as engines more
efﬁcient than those used on existing models or modular improve-
ments in aircraft. While incumbents (BAe and Bombardier) could
also apply such improvements to upgrade existing products, the
family architecture set a technological limit. Challenger companies
had greater freedom to introduce combinations of technologies tar-
geting speciﬁc market segments, resulting in efﬁciency gains over
incumbents.
Changing trends in fuel prices created the most important of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
demand windows. The declining trend of the 1990s boosted
demand for 50-seat RJs; the subsequent increase in oil prices
opened a window for 100–120-seat RJs. This exogenous factor
demonstrates how leadership depended partly on chance. The
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Table  2
Key drivers of leadership change: preconditions, windows of opportunity and leading products.
Preconditions Window of Opportunity New Leader
(other challengers –
type of proposed
designa)
Leading product
Technology Demand Regulatory
Bombardier’s leadership in the 50-seat RJ market
•  Advanced Canadian
aerospace
innovation system;
•  Bombardier
predecessor
companies’
technological
capabilities
• more efﬁcient
engine (5:1 bypass
ratio)
•  diffusion of ICTs
• US: hub-and-spoke
system; competition
of hubs; congestion
• EUR: liberalization,
integration
•  Low oil prices
•  preference for jets
over turboprops
• Scope clauses
capping the 50-seat
market
• Bombardier – Rad.
• (Embraer – Rad.)
• (Dornier – Mod.)
• (Shorts – Rad.)
• Bombardier CRJ200
and CRJ family,
leader in the
50–90-seat market
Embraer’s leadership in the 70–120 seat RJ market
•  Brazilian aerospace
innovation system;
•  Embraer’s
privatization and
experience in
commutes and
regional jets
• improvements in
engines, avionics,
materials; as well as
in  aviation
infrastructure
• increasing oil prices,
• replacement of aging
narrow-body jets
• ﬂuctuations in world
economy
• scope clauses
relaxed;
• environmental
regulations
• Embraer – Rad.
• (BAe – Mod.)
• (Boeing – Incr.)
•  (Airbus – Incr.)
•  (Bombardier – Incr.)
• (Fairchild-Dornier –
Rad.)
• Embraer “E-Jet”
family
(ERJ-170/190),
leader in the
90–120-seat market
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producers have already applied similar technologies, and their
producers implemented organizational innovations. In this sense,
leading companies were “strategic followers” (Mathews, 2005),Type of design: Incr. = incremental improvements in existing design; Mod. = ch
odules).
ompany best at “guessing” future fuel prices became the leader.
usiness cycles played an equally important role. Economic growth
n the mid-1990s and mid-2000s was fundamental to boosting
emand for RJs that were already in serial production. For chal-
engers to become leaders, a delicate combination of changes in
emand appeared necessary, conﬁrming but qualifying the ﬁnd-
ngs of Mathews (2005) and Lee and Mathews (2012). Upturns
nd expectations of growth secured sufﬁcient investment to start
ew product development. Downturn around the time of product
aunch (in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and after 2001) cleaned the
arket to the beneﬁt of the most efﬁcient challenger. Downturns
lso allowed a head-start to the best challenger (i.e. Bombardier
ver Embraer in the early 1990s, and Embraer over Fairchild-
ornier or Sukhoi in the early 2000s).
Among the many regulatory windows, two  proved particu-
arly important for leadership change. Firstly, the introduction
nd relaxation of “scope clauses”, or internal airline agreements
hat created opportunities for RJs against LCAs. These regulations
ere typically exogenous to aircraft producers’ strategies. Sec-
ndly, government policies such as loans to support new aircraft
evelopment, export-ﬁnancing regimes, and changing public own-
rship proved beneﬁcial for both new leaders. Many of these
ere “endogenous” windows, suggesting strategic collaboration
etween companies and their host governments to secure tem-
orary protective space for the emergence of radical innovations.
onversely, insufﬁcient regulatory windows may  have exacerbated
he difﬁculties of failed incumbents and challengers, i.e. Fokker or
ornier. Some regulatory windows affected demand in asymmet-
ical ways. For instance, all ﬁrms beneﬁtted from the liberalization
f the air transport market in the US and Europe. This was  not the
ase with China, where access was provided in exchange for tech-
ological or economic beneﬁts. Yet, this speciﬁc regulation does notPlease cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
ppear to have affected leadership change.30
Leadership change necessitated not only a favourable combina-
ion of windows of opportunity, but also their favourable timing.
30 The “net cost” of the various interventions remains to be seen in future studies. in modules; Rad. = radically new clean-sheet design (changes in architecture and
As expected, the timing and duration of windows were important
to ensure that challengers could ﬁnd a market niche, recover sunk
costs, and face limited competition. This of course also depended
on the strategic response.
6.2. Strategic response
We distinguished innovation strategies from long-term catch-
up strategies (the latter being discussed under ‘preconditions’). As
presumed, the strategy of new leaders was  to launch new aircraft
families while incumbents opted for extending the product ranges
of existing families. This may be interpreted in terms of limited
architectural or radical vs. incremental or modular innovations in
the Henderson and Clark (1990) framework. One should bear in
mind that the categorization of innovation in complex products in
a mature industry is not straight-forward (Murmann and Frenken,
2006).31 Launching a radical innovation (the CRJ family) to target
the 50-seats niche market paid off for Bombardier as the small-
est products of the incumbents were around 40% larger, and thus
less economical. Similarly, Embraer’s E-Jets had virtually no com-
petition in the 100–120-seat niche, thanks to the inherent limits
of the incremental innovation strategy of incumbents. New lead-
ers introduced technologically superior products and produced
them more efﬁciently. They relied on specialized competences,
such as design, system assembly, marketing, and risk-sharing part-
nerships. Their main product and organizational innovations were
new to the RJ market but not necessarily new to the world: LCA of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
31 Identifying architectural innovations depends on what we consider as a “dom-
inant design”. There are signiﬁcant architectural differences between a ‘T-tailed’
model with high-wing arrangement (the BAe-146), a T-tailed, low-wing plane with
engines mounted on the fuselage (F-100, CRJs, ERJ-145) or a regular-tailed model
with underwing-mounted engines (E-Jets, C-series). However, these differences
diminish when comparing jet vs. piston aircraft. Furthermore, other aircraft makers
had already applied these designs earlier. Hence we used the limited qualiﬁcation.
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caling down existing technology within an existing architecture
Christensen, 1997).
To reduce the high cost of new product development, both
ombardier and Embraer introduced only limited architectural and
odular changes, and applied existing technology (Canadair Chal-
enger business jet design elements were used in the CRJs, and
RJ-145 elements in the E-Jets generation). Government support
nd risk-sharing partnerships further mitigated costs. By max-
mizing similarity within families, successful challengers could
ntroduce an extended product range with different seating capac-
ty or engine performance in a timely manner (see Table 1). Variety
reation allowed companies to exploit evolving demand, conﬁrm-
ng Frenken et al. (1999). “Leading products” were crucial for
arket leadership. Over the past 30 years, leading products were
ailored to meet demand, shifting from the 70–100-seat to the 50-
eat and back to the 70–120-seat market, in response to changing
il prices and competition with turboprops and LCA.
Incumbents faced substantial uncertainty, due to ﬂuctuating
il prices and recurrent crises, rather than other factors.32 Resiz-
ng or upgrading existing products to recover sunk costs and
iversify product portfolio was a rational strategy. For instance,
Ae extended its RJ production and sold 170 Avro RJs under less
avourable market conditions after 1993. However, it could not
ustain its leadership nor generate sufﬁcient funds to develop
ewer models. Similarly, Bombardier’s decision not to develop a
ew aircraft is reasonable, particularly around the 9/11 down-
urn. Incumbents were trapped by their struggle to recover sunk
osts and by their lock-in to production arrangements with low
roﬁt margins (Lee and Malerba, 2016). They could not launch rad-
cal innovations, and were vulnerable to disruptive innovations by
ew challengers (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1997).
he effect of incumbent traps is more dramatic, considering that
roduct life-cycles were linked to competitiveness (Klepper, 1996).
ncumbents failing to start the development of a new family dur-
ng the declining phase of their leading product’s life cycle risked
ankruptcy.
Uncertainty affected the timing of response. Firms that waited
oo long to respond to emerging windows were also trapped by the
ong lead-time, if the relevant window closed before the product
hey invested in could reach the break-even point (see Dornier’s
o-328Jet). Nevertheless, ﬁrms needed luck and foresight ability
o judge how long a particular window of opportunity would be
vailable.
Governments proved to be strategic actors in innovation sys-
ems whose timely interventions were instrumental in leadership
hange. Their interventions effectively modiﬁed the windows of
pportunity by setting standards, selecting trading partners, or
ranting market access in return for access to technology. Efﬁ-
ient “public-private coalitions” supported successful challengers.
t the time of product launch, direct or indirect public ﬁnancial sup-
ort reduced risks for new entrants.33 Bombardier received export
redits while Embraer’s buyers had access to an interest-rate equal-
zation mechanism. Embraer traded the promise of better positions
or military procurement in exchange for ﬁnding investors pro-Please cite this article in press as: Vértesy, D., Preconditions, windows
changes in the regional jet industry. Res. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.o
iding it with ﬁnance and technology for the E-Jets. The Brazilian
overnment’s effective support helped mitigate the effects of a
artially missed window of opportunity: while the ERJ-135/145
32 Bombardier’s CEO offers a good illustration: “Asked to predict when struggling
ombardier will return to ﬁnancial strength, [. . .]  Paul Tellier challenged the ques-
ioner: ‘Tell me  how long it is going to take for the airlines to get back on their feet,
here the Canadian dollar will be, where the oil price will be, and I will tell you
hen.’ ” (Warwick, 2004).
33 Government loans (of up to a third of the development costs) are compatible
ith international trade law. See e.g. the 1992 EU – US Agreement on Large Civil
ircraft; however, the applicability of this agreement to RJs is debatable. PRESS
 xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
was launched after Bombardier’s CRJs, Embraer could catch up rel-
atively quickly. Companies needed governments to defend their
trading positions, as only governments could ﬁght “trade wars”
with retaliatory measures. Yet, the Canada-Brazil trade dispute did
not prevent subsequent leadership change, especially once both
parties were found to be in breach of international trade law (Doh,
2003; Goldstein and McGuire, 2004). However, the reluctance of
the Dutch government to bail out Fokker in 1996 or the inability
of Brazil to ﬁnance Embraer in the early 1990s shows that domes-
tic politics and macroeconomic conditions limit the scope of public
intervention.
6.3. Preconditions
Both successful challengers were experienced aircraft produc-
ers when they responded to the relevant windows of opportunity.
Their salient product innovations that triggered leadership change
were more competence-enhancing than competence-destroying
for the companies, conﬁrming Tushman and Anderson (1986).
Evidently, accumulated technological capabilities mattered for
leadership in the RJ industry.
The two  leaders successfully implemented a long-term catch-up
strategy, and had already climbed the steep initial learning-curve
before assuming leadership. The company’s trajectory may  be mis-
leading in the case of Bombardier. While at ﬁrst it appears to have
followed what Lee and Lim (2001) called a special leap-frogging
strategy by rapidly accumulating technological capabilities through
the various companies it acquired, from the perspective of the
Canadian aircraft industry, the path is more gradual: RJs are a
continuation of turboprop commuter and business jet production.
Embraer also gradually and systematically built up the knowledge
and skills necessary to produce and market small aircraft. Both
companies possessed the necessary absorptive capacity to apply
existing aerospace technology to RJs. Explicitly or implicitly, the
long-term catch-up strategy involved collaboration between dom-
inant ﬁrms and their host governments.
The advanced state of the sectoral aerospace industry in Canada
and Brazil allowed companies to respond effectively to emerging
windows of opportunity. Companies could draw upon available
resources (skilled researchers, engineers and managers, public
research organizations), and make use of institutions that facili-
tated interactions with internal and external actors. The successful
long-term catch-up of Embraer highlights the government’s role
in the innovation system. Brazil created preconditions for growth
by training scientists and engineers in ITA, performing public R&D
at CTA, and providing a favourable business environment and
access to external ﬁnance and technology. Canada has similarly
been investing in its innovation system since the 1950s. At the
same time, both sectoral innovation systems were open enough
to supplement missing local technology with foreign sources. With
risk-sharing partnerships, top-tier ﬁrms indirectly beneﬁtted from
government support provided to second-tier component suppli-
ers. Furthermore, active links with buyers in key export markets
provided ﬁrms with the knowledge to identify niches. Conversely,
the underperformance of the innovation systems in Indonesia, Rus-
sia or China prevented companies from implementing optimal
strategies. The lack of experience of AVIC/Comac and of Sukhoi
to design, certify and sell aircraft prevented them from respond-
ing faster than Embraer when given the opportunity. The difﬁculty
of the apparently abundantly ﬁnanced AVIC/Comac to exploit win-
dows of opportunity highlights that different types of preconditions of opportunity and innovation strategies: Successive leadership
rg/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.011
– including ﬁnancial and technological capabilities – cannot be
traded off. The capacity to ﬁnance new product development
proved to be another precondition in this capital-intensive sector.
Not only strategic choices or incumbent traps, but also institutional
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arriers to secure sufﬁcient funding brought about the downfall of
okker and Dornier, and the delays of Embraer in the 1990s.
.4. Outlook
The mid-sized jet market will doubtless witness future lead-
rship changes. The capacity of our methodology to predict which
ompany will next assume leadership and when is limited by uncer-
ainties as to the nature and timing of new exogenous windows of
pportunity. Nevertheless, salient trends can be identiﬁed based
n known capabilities and revealed strategies. Embraer is likely to
aintain its leadership for some years with the overhauled “E2”
ets. Bombardier’s fate depends on demand for its C-Series jets in
he non-traditional 110–160-seat class. Unlike past incumbents,
ombardier’s product portfolio is diverse enough to help the ﬁrm
vercome the “incumbent trap”. Sustained, low fuel prices may
mprove the chances for late entrants in the 100-seat class, such
s Comac, Mitsubishi or Sukhoi. Even if the models recently intro-
uced fall short of becoming leading products, a modest market
resence may  provide the necessary capabilities, creating the pre-
onditions for long-term catch-up and eventual leadership of these
rms.
Another question is whether our conclusions on the RJ indus-
ry are valid for other capital- and technology-intensive sectors,
uch as LCA, automobiles or shipbuilding, or industries involving
omplex product systems. While demand conditions may  differ
cross sectors, high capital and technology barriers to entry mean
hat the preconditions are similarly important. Even in relatively
ess strategic industries, excluding the role of governments from
ndustry dynamics would be unrealistic.
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